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ABSTRACT 
 
KITCHEN, THEODORE.  Aggressive Monetization:  Why the Pay for Currency Model 
is Dominating the iOS App Store Today. 
Department of Economics, May 2014.     
 
ADVISOR: Yufei Ren 
 
 
The Apple iOS App Store has only been around for 5 years, and yet it has 
completely changed the way that mobile software is distributed.  In this brief period, the 
online marketplace has seen dramatic shifts in the most successful strategies used by iOS 
software developers and, more specifically, game developers to gain revenue.  As of 
March 14
th
 2014 fifteen of the twenty top-grossing iOS apps feature some form of in-app 
currency that users may purchase with real money, eighteen are mobile video games, and 
all twenty of these apps are free to download.  This paper explores a new business 
strategy, the pay for currency model, which has been highly successful in generating 
huge profits from App Store software distribution. This paper first builds on existing 
economic models for network externalities to include non-paying customers and provides 
an argument for how iOS games with in-app currencies can achieve a form of first-degree 
price discrimination. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Games in the App Store 
According to an Apple press release, as of January 7
th
, 2013 the App Store has 
achieved over 40 billion app downloads and app developers have been paid over seven 
billion dollars for their products and services.  These figures are quite large given how 
recently the App store came into existence. 
Since its inception in July 2008, the Apple iOS App Store has revolutionized the 
way that consumer software has been distributed.  In a relatively short time period, the 
Apple controlled software marketplace has seen dramatic shifts in how software 
development firms use the iOS operating system platform to distribute successful 
software products.  A highly volatile marketplace, the App Store has seen many shifts in 
which apps are popular, and how apps make money.  One thing that has remained fairly 
consistent is that most of the top positions on Apple’s “highest grossing” apps list; have 
been held by mobile computer games.  This has many implications for how video games 
are becoming accessible to a more general audience.  In the past it was necessary to 
purchase a gaming console in order to play high quality video games.  With the number 
of high production value games on the App Store, it seems that video games are 
beginning to be more appealing to anyone with a smartphone, a population which has 
seen enormous growth in the past several years. 
While the App Store’s top grossing list is comprised almost entirely by games, the 
market for iOS games on the App Store is quite distinct from the market for mainstream 
console video games that run on Sony’s PlayStation or Microsoft’s Xbox.  One important 
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difference is the scale of the gaming software.  PlayStation and Xbox games offer better 
resolution and graphics, more reliable online play and longer and larger games.  New 
games for designed for the home console market can run as high as $65, whereas paid 
video game programs in the App Store rarely cost more then $5 or $10 and there is a 
large number of completely free games available as well. 
 
1.2 Distribution Strategies Used in the App Store 
There are several different models that firms use to price and distribute their 
software goods in the App Store.  Proprietary software is the most traditional form of 
software distribution.  In the proprietary software distribution model, the software is 
priced and distributed like a single good.  The firm sets a fixed price for the software 
good, and any user who purchases the good will have unlimited use of the entire product.  
One example of a popular proprietary title on the App Store is “Minecraft: Pocket 
Edition” which is sold for $6.99. 
One distribution method that has seen widespread use in the App Store is the 
freemium model. In this model, the user may first download a free version, which has 
advertising, or some disabled functionality.  The distributor then also offers a premium 
version of the app, which costs a flat fee in exchange for full functionality and/or disabled 
advertising.  The user may play the free version as a trial, and then if the user likes the 
free version enough, he or she may choose to purchase the full version.  In the freemium 
model, the software company provides two or more products:  the trial version which is 
free to download but has limitations, and then a premium paid version of the App which 
costs money to download.  The firm may also then offer an “elite” version of the app, 
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which has even more functionality and content than the premium version.  One example 
of this type of app is the original “Angry Birds” game, which saw tremendous success in 
the early days of the App Store.   
Recently, there has been some innovation in the way that people pay for iOS apps.  
Now, software distributors have the ability to allow what is called an “in app purchase”.  
In-app purchases allow users to purchase virtual goods and services automatically with a 
credit card.  For example, within Pandora Radio, a free internet radio app, a user may 
purchase Pandora One for $3.99 removing advertisements.  In-app purchases can also be 
for some kind of in app currency.  For example within the iOS game Clash of Clans, the 
user is able to purchase “gems”, which is an in game currency that allows the player to 
progress faster.  In-app purchases have completely turned around the way firms become 
profitable on the App Store.  In-app purchases can range from digital currency, software 
updates, extra progress in a game, or added functionality. 
Games such as Clash of Clans can be said to be following the pay for currency 
business model.  In this model, the full game is free for the player to download but 
players may purchase some form of in-game currency.  This in game currency can serve a 
variety of functions.  In some games, the currency allows users to progress through the 
game more quickly.  The currency may also be used to purchase additional features in the 
game.  For example a user could spend in game currency to purchase better weapons in a 
fighting game, or new buildings in an empire builder game.  It is important to note, that in 
the context of mobile games, the currency can only be used to purchase virtual goods 
within the context of the game.  That is, the currency cannot be used to buy other goods 
that are not part of the game.  Another feature of these in-game currencies is that they are 
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non-transferrable.  A user who purchases in game currency may not give that currency to 
another user. 
In the past 3 years, the iTunes App Store has become a completely different place.  
Three years ago, the game apps that dominated the App Store’s top grossing list mostly 
followed a freemium business model.  Since the inception of the in-app purchase in the 
App Store however there has been an explosion in the number of games following the 
pay for currency model.  Many firms have been very successful in implementing this new 
model because most of the top-grossing apps on the App Store have some sort of in game 
currency. 
 
1.3 Price Discrimination in the App Store 
One of the most interesting aspects of the pay for currency model is the way that 
it allows consumers to spend as much money as they want.  In a game such as the 
original Angry Birds, which did not follow the pay for currency model, a user may play 
the trial version for free, and then if their reservation price is higher than the price, they 
may purchase the full game.  On the other hand, in a game like Clash of Clans, which 
follows the pay for currency model, a user may download the full version for free and 
then purchase currency to advance more quickly through the game.  In this model, each 
user faces the decision of how much money to spend on in-game currency.  Users who 
value progress in the game more highly will spend more than users who do not care about 
progressing in the game. This paper argues that this is a form of 1
st
 degree price 
discrimination because each consumer will be charged exactly what he or she is willing 
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to pay.  This is especially important because some dedicated consumers might be willing 
to spend hundreds if not thousands of dollars on the currency. 
 
1.4 Network Externalities for iOS Apps 
Part of the reason that the pay for currency model is dominating the freemium 
business model is that positive network externalities are generally much stronger in pay 
for currency.  In the freemium model, the software company benefits from network 
externalities by users simply wanting to play the full version because their friends are.  
This seems to be a simple bandwagon effect, as people want to have the product that 
everyone else has.  Once a user has bought the game however, the network externality 
does not cause the user to want to spend more money on the game because there is no 
option to spend more money once the full version is downloaded. 
In the pay for currency model of iOS games, users are encouraged to compete 
with one another (in the sense of making a bigger village, getting a higher score, etc.).  
What this does is it makes players want to spend more money in order to achieve a higher 
rank in the game faster.  This allows firms to take profits from users’ competitive 
behavior.  It is players’ desire to compete with each other that allows firms to charge 
players to quickly advance.  Many players are more willing to discreetly pay money to 
advance and keep up with their friends than to spend hours playing the game to advance 
more slowly. 
At first glance, one might assume that both pay for currency applications and 
freemium applications are primarily benefiting from the bandwagon effect.  This is a 
good observation for freemium apps.  Because the way that these apps make profit is 
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through purchases of the premium app, each additional purchase of the app due to the 
bandwagon effect makes a profit for the firm.  
In the pay for currency model however, this does not work as well.  Yes, the 
bandwagon effect doubtless causes higher downloads of the app, but downloads alone do 
not generate the firm’s revenue.  Instead, players are competing with each other to have 
the highest score.  Users who spend money can advance faster, and so there is an 
incentive to purchase currency in order to be more competitive against other users.  At 
the highest levels of the game, this can be quite serious and users often spend quite a lot 
of money in order to remain the highest ranked. 
 
1.5 Other Economic Advantages of the Pay for Currency Model 
One trend that many markets have seen in recent years has been a shift from 
consumers purchasing goods and services with a one-time payment, to a subscription 
model in which the customer periodically makes payments to use the product or service.  
In many ways the pay for currency model more closely resembles a subscription rather 
than a goods business model.  While the pay for currency model is not a true subscription 
business model, it is far similar to a subscription model than it is to the one time payment 
model. 
In the freemium business model, a user has two transactions possible to them.  
The first is to download the free game.  This benefits the distributor in several ways even 
though it does not provide direct profit.  Every download of an app, even a free app is a 
benefit to the distributor.  A higher download count means higher advertising revenues, 
greater network externalities, a more significant presence in the App Store, and also 
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makes the company more likely to attract investors.  It is important to note that all of 
these benefits are also achieved by download count in the pay for currency model. 
The second transaction available to the user after downloading the free trial 
version is to upgrade to the premium version.  This generates one-time revenue for the 
distribution company.  Once a user has downloaded the premium version, the distribution 
company can no longer generate any revenue from that consumer. 
On the other hand in the pay for currency model, the first transaction available to 
consumers is still the free download of the app.  This again comes with the same benefits 
to producers as it does in the free premium model, except with stronger network 
externalities as described above.  In the freemium model, the user may only make one 
more transaction: buying the premium app.  In the pay for currency model, the user is 
able, and likely to make numerous additional purchases over time.  The company gains a 
cash flow over time, similar to that in the subscription business model described above.  
This allows the firm to be sustained through periods of lower downloads of the app.  The 
pay for currency model is also parallel to the subscription model in the fact that its costs 
will be much higher.  In freemium, only a small amount of maintenance is required of the 
firm once the App is released.  In the pay for currency model however, the firm must 
maintain expensive servers that handle the multiplayer aspects of the game. 
Another reason that this business model is so effective is that the initial free 
download allows users to have a dynamic reservation price.  Perhaps one month, a user 
does not use the app very much, and they are able to pay a smaller “subscription” price 
than they normally would.  On the other hand, in a different month, a user could use the 
app a lot, and be willing to spend quite a lot of money on in app purchases effectively 
  8 
increasing their subscription reservation price.  The user is neither restricted by a set 
monthly fee, or by a single payment, but each month may pay as much as they are 
possibly willing to. 
 
1.6 The Contribution and Organization of this Paper 
This paper seeks to investigate the economics behind what makes the pay for 
currency model so successful in the iOS App Store marketplace.  This thesis is organized 
into four sections in addition to this introduction.  The second section is a literature 
review, which looks into related economic topics such as price discrimination, network 
externalities, and software as a service.  The third section constructs an economic model 
for network externalities that allows for non-paying users.  The fourth section compares 
price discrimination in the pay for currency model and the freemium model and argues 
that the pay for currency model achieves a form of first-degree price discrimination.  The 
final section will be a conclusion that will discuss the economic implications of the 
increasingly powerful distribution tools available to software distributors.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
The economics of mobile and more specifically iOS app distribution is a 
relatively new field and, as a result, there is not much existing economic literature on the 
topic.  Firstly this paper seeks to review literature about the underlying economic ideas 
that are helpful in explaining the pay for currency model’s success in the App Store.  
Secondly this paper seeks to review literature about the economics of software 
distribution in general. 
 
2.1 Review of Price Discrimination 
Because it is such an important aspect of the pay for currency model, several 
papers in this literature review focus on price discrimination.  Kou Ahn and Aydin (2011) 
study price discrimination in a retail market.  The examples of this paper help us 
understand in chapter four how the freemium model is a form of third-degree price 
discrimination.  The retail goods market has many differences from the online 
marketplace of the App Store but it is important to look at other forms of price 
discrimination in different types of marketplaces.  
Silve and Bernhardt (1998) explain how some firms allow their software to be 
pirated as a form of price discrimination.  In this paper they explore how firms may have 
incentives to allow limited piracy or illegal downloading of their software.  In this way 
the firm gets more people using their software and more familiar with it, making their 
product more well known and widely used.  This idea has many parallels to the pay for 
currency model.  Firstly, in both cases firms are benefiting from more people using their 
software even if they are not paying customers through network externalities.  Secondly, 
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in both cases firms are reaching consumers with extremely low reservation prices. While 
not specifically about mobile software, this paper is especially useful because it gives 
insight into how price discrimination is applied in the software industry in general.  
Another important point of this paper is how software firms may benefit from network 
externalities that result from more people using their product and being familiar with it 
even if the consumer is not a paying customer. 
Before we explore exactly why freemium firms are third-degree price 
discriminators in chapter 4, we must justify the existence of a free version of the game.  
In freemium games, a free version is sold at a price of zero and at least one pay version is 
sold at prices set by the firm.  A question arising from this then, is what does the firm 
gain by selling the free version at a price of zero?  Silve and Bernhardt (1998) provide an 
answer to this question.  From this 1998 paper we learned that software companies can 
benefit by allowing limited piracy of their software, in the presence of network 
externalities. 
Firms that follow the freemium model use the same technique.  They allow less 
serious customers to download a portion of the game for free, because network 
externalities allow them to gain revenue by adding non-paying users.  In both of these 
cases the firms allow an inferior version to be given away for free.  The free versions of 
the iOS games do not have all the features that the full version does.  Similarly the free 
pirated software comes with a risk of being caught and penalized for software piracy. 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005) lay out the basics of price discrimination.  The 
authors define first-degree price discrimination as selling goods or services to each 
consumer at his or her reservation price.  The pay for currency business model also 
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achieves a form of first-degree price discrimination because each user may spend their 
reservation price on buying advancements in the game.  A key idea here is how first-
degree price discrimination is able to convert virtually all consumer surplus into producer 
surplus. Other important information in this chapter includes information on other types 
of price discrimination.  This is important in analyzing how other business models such 
as freemium use price discrimination. 
Varian(2010) provides another perspective on price discrimination.   This 
provides us with several examples of different types of price discrimination.  This chapter 
is extremely important to the argument that the pay for currency model achieves first-
degree price discrimination and that the freemium model is a form of third-degree price 
discrimination. 
 
2.2 Review of Network Externalities 
Another chapter in the textbook by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005) provides the 
general idea of how network externalities work.  This section of the Microeconomics 
textbook includes information about how network externalities work.  Specifically “The 
Bandwagon Effect” has a lot of implications for this thesis.  The authors explain that the 
bandwagon effect happens when the more consumers already have a product or service, 
the more other consumers will want it, hopping on the metaphorical “bandwagon”.  This 
explains the idea that a product or service can be more attractive the more people are 
using it.  This is applicable to the pay for currency model, in which consumers are more 
likely to play a game that many of their friends play because of many of the interactive 
features.  It is important to note however that the bandwagon effect does not fully explain 
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the effect of the pay for currency model’s network externalities.  The bandwagon effect 
only refers to wanting to have the same products as peers.  While this is certainly also 
true of pay for currency games, these games have another aspect which is player 
competition.  Not only do consumers want to have the product because those around 
them have it, but they are motivated to purchase currency in order to better compete with 
friends who also use the software. 
Varian(2010) lays down the foundation of the economic model that chapter three 
of this thesis builds on.  Varian takes the approach of representing network externalities 
with a quadratic demand curve.  This idea proves to be very useful for interpreting how 
pay for currency apps make money.  This work provides a concrete model for network 
externalities that allows us to build on the general ideas that we got from Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld(2005). 
One of the first economists to look into how network externalities affect the 
computer industry in general was Chow (1967).  This paper, although old for a paper 
about the economics of the computer industry, perfectly highlights how positive network 
externalities have a huge effect on the demand for computers. This translates directly into 
the demand for software, and in the case of this thesis, mobile software. The more people 
using a computer product, the more useful the product will be, and more people will want 
it and gain utility from it.  This idea is even more powerful in recent years with the 
advent of the Internet.  Not only are people using the same products, but are actually 
interacting with each other in the products over the Internet.  This has significant 
implications about how powerful network externalities can be for computer products. 
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2.3 Other Sources of Interest 
Suarez, Cusumano and Kahl (2013) give insight into the model of software as a 
service. This paper is about how software firms rely on service revenues when product 
sales decline.  The most important point that the authors make is that when a software 
firm supplying software goods (standalone pieces of software that users only buy once) 
begins to supply services, their best decision is to remain in the services market.  This 
relevant because one of the advantages of a pay for currency app is that it is able to 
support itself on service revenues (in app currency purchases) to sustain itself even when 
download count might be in decline.  In many ways it makes more sense to think of an 
iOS App using the pay for currency model as a service rather than a product.  This is 
because unlike a product, which a consumer buys only once, pay for currency App users 
have a certain amount of money that they are willing to spend over a certain period of 
time. The result of this is that each month, each consumer is paying however much his or 
her monthly reservation price is for the service of using the App. 
 
The ideas presented in these papers come together to make the basis of this thesis.  
The most important ideas are those of first and third-degree price discrimination, and 
network externalities.  It is these ideas that allow us to explain why the pay for currency 
model is such an effective strategy. 
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III. The role of network externalities 
 
3.1 A Model for Network Externalities With Non-Paying customers 
When considering the microeconomics of iOS app distribution, as well as 
software distribution in general, it is important to assess the importance of network 
externalities.  As we learned from Chow(1967), the computer software industry is 
especially likely to experience these externalities. 
If we look at iOS games that follow the pay for currency model we can see even 
stronger reasons to believe in the presence of network externalities.  One reason is that 
most of these games have some sort of server that allows users to interact and compete 
with each other.  Economic intuition tells us that users can gain additional utility for the 
interactive element of the games, which allows them to compete with their friends and 
other players.  We assume that players get more satisfaction by being part of a network in 
which there are more people to compete with.  According to Varian(2010), this results in 
the players having a higher willingness to pay if they can get higher utility from the 
product. 
One significant economic question is why games that follow the pay for currency 
model always allow free riders to use up bandwidth and server time on the network.  
Certainly having higher server traffic means higher costs for these firms, so why do they 
allow for users to join without spending any money?  A possible answer to this question 
lies in benefits from network externalities.  Perhaps having a larger network allows for 
these firms to generate more revenue, or makes it easier for them to enter a market.  To 
explore this, we start with the model for network externalities presented in Varian(2010). 
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In this model we will start by constructing a model for demand without network 
externalities.  We will then add to the model to include network externalities.  Let Nm 
denote the maximum number of people willing to purchase a software good, that is, the 
number of people who will purchase the good at a price of zero.  Assuming a linear 
demand curve, let those people be indexed in increasing order of willingness to pay by: 
 
and assume for now that the value of the good to person v is also v. 
Let the price of this good be denoted by p.  Then the number of people who buy 
the good will be Nm-p.  This model will change however when we introduce network 
externalities. 
Now, assume that this market exhibits network externalities this will mean that 
each person’s willingness to pay for a good will depend on the number of people using 
this good.  We suppose that person v places a value of vn on the good where n is the size 
of the network.  We will also assume that  because the number of people actually 
buying the good can never be greater than the number of people willing to buy the good 
at a price of zero.  Let c denote the marginal cost of production of the good.  In this 
model we will assume that firms will set price equal to marginal cost.  That is, we are 
assuming that .  For simplicity we will also assume that the firm is facing constant 
marginal costs, meaning a flat supply curve. 
For any given price, one of the people in the market will be just indifferent to 
purchasing the good.  Let  denote the index of this person.   This person’s willingness to 
pay will equal the price giving: 
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from this we get that the number of people willing to pay for the good is 
 
solving for  and substituting, equilibrium will be at 
   (3.1) 
We plot the equation on graph 3.1. 
 
GRAPH 3.1 Demand Curve for Firms with Network Externalities 
 
 
From the graph we can see that there are three potential equilibriums.  The first is 
at point c.  In this case no one is in the network, and no one is willing to join because an 
empty network is useless.  The second equilibrium occurs at point a.  This represents the 
critical mass of the network.  If a firm doesn’t reach this critical size of the network, the 
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demand slips backward towards zero because willingness to pay is too low. When the 
network surpasses its critical mass, it continues to get larger until it falls back to 
equilibrium at point b.  Any firm attempting to enter a market that involves significant 
network externalities, must attempt to reach the network critical mass as quickly as 
possible, because failing to do so will result in a return to equilibrium with no consumers 
in the network.  Point b represents the only stable equilibrium.  Surpassing the critical 
mass will push the firm towards the equilibrium at point b. 
There is case however, in which a firm is completely unable to be profitable in 
this market.  Suppose that firm is facing costs that are higher than anyone’s willingness to 
pay.  This scenario is depicted in graph 3.2. 
 
Graph 3.2 A Firm Facing too High a Marginal Cost 
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In this case, the firm is unable to make the price low enough for people to join and 
the only equilibrium will be at point c with a quantity of zero.  This firm will only be able 
to enter this market if demand is somehow shifting up.  Thinking back on the lessons 
from Varian(2010) about network externalities and the formation of this demand curve, 
we know people’s willingness to pay for the good depends on the size of the network. 
In our current model, we assume that consumers have only two choices: purchase 
the good with the network externality, or don’t purchase the good.  This makes sense for 
goods that cost money to buy, but products that follow the pay for currency model 
present the user with the option to be a free rider.  A user can download the app, and use 
just as much of the network’s bandwidth and computing resources as a paying customer 
at no cost to themselves.  For purposes of analyzing the pay for currency model we 
assume that consumers have three options.  The first is to not download the app and not 
make any purchases.  The second choice is to be a free rider by downloading the app and 
not spending any money on it.  The third choice is to join the network and spend money 
on the product. 
Turning back to the economic intuition surrounding network externalities, we 
know that the more people using a network, the more people will be willing to pay.  In 
this case allowing free riders to a network can have an effect on paying customers’ 
willingness to pay.  Let nf denote the effect of network free riders on consumer’s 
willingness to pay and let n still denote the number of paying customers on the network.  
Also assume that any increase or decrease in the number of free riders will increase or 
decrease nf respectively.  In this case revenue for the firm is still equal to n*p.  The free 
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riders do not directly contribute to the firm’s revenues but still help to strengthen the 
network externalities. 
The new demand curve is defined by  
  (3.2) 
The number of free riders will not directly increase revenues but will make paying 
users willing to pay more, shifting the demand curve up and bringing the flat supply 
curve under the top of the demand curve. Graph 3.3  shows how the demand curve will 
shift if a constant number of free riders are added to the network. 
 
Graph 3.3 The Effects of Adding Free riders 
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A firm can shift its demand curve up by allowing a number of free riders in to the 
network.  This allows the firm to enter markets that would otherwise be prohibitively 
expensive.  In this graph, point a once again represents the firm’s critical mass, and point 
b represents the stable equilibrium for the firm.  Point c however is less straightforward.  
We must first remember that in this graph, we are assuming a constant level of nf.  With 
this in mind, we know that this firm already has network externality effects of nf even if 
there are no paying customers in the network.  Point c represents the maximum marginal 
cost a firm could face and still have a critical mass of zero.  This means that if a firm can 
start out by getting enough free riders in the network, they will be able to reach their 
critical mass before any paying customers join. 
Before in app purchases existed, it was more difficult for firms to allow free riders 
onto the same server as paying customers.  Users could not download apps for free and 
then later decide to spend money on it and so firms were unable to get large user bases of 
free riders to help boost willingness to pay.  This is the case that we can see in graph 2.  
Because willingness to pay is so far under the cost of production, firms are not able to 
enter the market.  With the advent of the in-app purchase, software companies have been 
able to lure a large enough base of free riders that the network externality effects cause 
market demand to surpasses the cost of providing the service. 
 
3.2 Comparative Statics 
Firms that utilize the pay for currency model may benefit from these free riders in 
three ways.  We make propositions about these three advantages and use comparative 
statics to prove them.  The first proposition is that allowing free riders on a network can 
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increase the maximum marginal cost for which a firm can be profitable.  Secondly, 
adding free riders will allow firms to gain higher revenues.  The final proposition is that 
adding free riders allows a firm to reduce the required critical mass of the network, 
allowing for easier market entry. 
Proposition 1:  A firm can enter a market with a higher marginal cost by allowing 
free riders to join. 
We prove this proposition in two ways. Firstly we show that the maximum 
marginal cost is always higher for firms with free rider network externality effects.  
Secondly, we show that the derivative of cmax with respect to nf is always positive given 
our assumptions. 
Looking our original model without free riders, we know that there is a maximum 
level of marginal cost for a firm to be successful in the market.  From equation 3.1 and 
the fact that p = c at equilibrium, we have: 
 (3.3) 
simplifying equation 3.3 we get 
 (3.4) 
to find the highest marginal cost that the firm can face, we take the derivative with 
respect to n from equation 3.4  and set it equal to zero.  
 
 
 
 (3.5) 
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Plugging 3.5 into equation 3.3 we get 
 
 
and finally 
 (3.6) 
So we know that a firm that does not allow free riders is only be able to get to a 
stable equilibrium if the marginal cost is less than cmax1.  Now let us consider a firm that 
allows a number of free riders to join.  These free riders generate network externality 
effects of nf.  We solve for the highest possible marginal cost in which the firm may still 
have a stable equilibrium.  We start with our demand curve for network externalities with 
free riders given by equation 3.2. 
 (3.7) 
 (3.8) 
Taking the derivative we get 
 
 
 
 (3.9) 
substituting equation 3.9 back into the equation 3.8 we get 
. 
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This equation can be simplified to into 
. (3.10) 
The firm that allows free riders and has a free rider effect of nf is able to reach a 
higher value of cmax than a firm with no free riders is able to reach of cmax1.  The firm 
allowing free riders can produce at a higher marginal cost than the firm that does not 
allow free riders.  What this means is that firms that allow free riders are able to support 
bigger networks that have higher marginal costs than firms that do not allow free riders. 
Now that we have equation 3.10 for the maximum marginal cost for a firm with nf 
free rider effects, we can take the derivative with respect to nf to see how these effects 
change cmax. 
 (3.11) 
since both nf and Nm are positive by assumption, equation 3.11 shows us that the 
derivative of cmax with respect to nf is always positive.  In other words, a firm can be 
profitable in markets that would otherwise be too costly by adding free riders to the 
network.  
Proposition 2: Adding free riders to a network has a positive effect on overall 
revenue for a firm. 
The first assumption that must be made here is that the firm is facing a marginal 
cost of less than cmax because otherwise a firm is not able to be profitable in this market.  
We show that adding free riders boosts revenue by proving that 
 
  24 
Showing this tells us that in an increase in the number of free riders results in an 
increase in total revenue where R is revenue generated by the firm.  To begin, we have 
the revenue equation. 
 (3.12) 
Substituting equation 3.7 into equation 3.12 gives 
 
 
we then take the derivative with respect to nf 
 (3.13) 
We know that this is always positive because n is always smaller than Nm and 
both are positive by assumption.  By our assumption that an increase in the number of 
free riders results in an increase in nf, we have that adding more free riders to a network 
results in higher revenues.  Economically speaking, this means that firms who allow free 
riders face consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for their product.  The firm is 
generating more revenue at this level with free riders than if they do not have free riders.  
More free rider effects means a higher value of R or more revenue for the firm. 
Proposition 3:  Allowing free riders into a network allows firms to have lower 
critical masses.   
This means that it will take fewer paying customers to reach the critical mass.  Let 
the critical mass of the network be denoted ncrit.  Assume that cmax1 exists and that the 
firm is able to enter the market and be profitable.  In order to show this, we must prove 
that 
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. 
  In our model for network externalities with free riders, from equation 3.7 we know that 
the critical mass is at 
. (3.14) 
Solving equation 3.14 however gives two different values of n.  One of these values is the 
equilibrium condition, and the other will be the critical mass.  In order to solve for critical mass 
we use the quadratic formula.  The quadratic formula gives two values when solved.  The larger 
of this value is the point of equilibrium where the firm is producing.  The smaller value is the 
critical mass of the network.  Simplifying equation 3.14 gives 
 (3.15) 
setting equation 3.15 equal to zero 
 (3.16) 
Using the correct version of the quadratic formula on equation 3.16 gives us an 
equation for ncrit.  The correct version is the one where the terms are added, because this 
results in the smaller value that represents the network’s critical mass. 
 (3.17) 
taking the derivative with respect to nf in eqation 3.17 gives us 
. (3.18) 
Since nf and Nm are both positive by assumption, we can conclude from equation 
3.18 that  
. 
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In this way we have proven that an increase in nf results in a decrease in the 
critical mass of the network.  This is a very important phenomenon in markets such as the 
iOS App Store.  We know from Varian(2010) that firms in markets with network 
externalities are not able to be profitable at any point below the firms’ critical mass.  
Firms who are trying to enter a market, must make it very attractive to join the network, 
which requires users to already be on the network.   We have learned from proposition 3 
that it is possible for a firm to reduce the required number of paying customers at the 
critical mass by adding free riders to the network.  This makes it easier for a firm to enter 
the market.  In this way firms are incentivized to get as many free riders as possible until 
the critical mass is reached. 
 
3.3 Numerical Examples 
The table below shows this model’s predictions for several variables first for a 
firm that experiences network externalities, and then for a firm that also experiences 
network externalities, but also allows for free riders to join the network.  In this example 
firm 1 is the firm that does not allow for free riders and firm 2 does allow for free riders.  
In this case, we are assuming that Nm is equal to 100 for both firms, that nf is equal to 
zero for firm 1, and that nf is equal to 20 for firm 2.  We explore how these firms 
marginal cost and critical mass differ for different levels of marginal cost. 
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Table 3.1 Numerical Example 
Firm Firm 1 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 2 
Marginal Cost 2,000 3,000 2,000 3,000 
Revenue 144,722 0 160,000 193,485 
Critical Mass 27.639 N/A 0 15.505 
Max Cost 2500 2500 3600 3600 
 
As we can see from table 3.1, the firm that allows free riders gains several 
advantages over the firm that does not.  First of all in the case that marginal cost is equal 
to 2000, both firms are able to enter the market because 2000 is under both firm’s 
maximum value for p.  We do see however that firm 2 is able to generate more revenue 
than firm 1 based on this model. 
Using economic intuition, we can say that that the free rider effects boost 
everyone else’s willingness to pay.  This means that some people who previously were 
not purchasing the good now are willing to pay for the good so n or the number of people 
buying increases. 
Another important observation here lies in the interpretation of critical mass.  The 
critical mass is the unstable equilibrium that the firm must surpass in terms of number of 
paying customers in the network in order to be successful in the market.  With a marginal 
cost of 2000, firm 1 needs to get n to be greater than 27.639 in order to enter the market.  
Firm 2 however seems to have a critical mass of zero.  This is because firm 2 has enough 
free riders to get their critical mass down to zero, so they do not need any paying 
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customers to get up to that point.  The firm will then be able to attract paying customers 
who have increased willingness to pay until equilibrium is reached.   
In the case that marginal cost is equal to 3000, we can see a different story here.  
Firm 1 in this case has really no way of entering the market.  Their potential consumers 
are simply not willing to pay enough for them to cover cost.  Without free riders to boost 
other consumer’s willingness to pay, firm 1 cannot enter the market without huge losses.  
Firm 2 on the other hand can enter the market.  This firm will enjoy revenues of 193,485 
and a critical mass of 15.505. 
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IV Price Discrimination 
 
So far we have discovered that network externalities allow for firms to enter 
markets that would otherwise be prohibitively costly by allowing free riders to increase 
the network effects on willingness to pay.  Allowing these free riders also allows the 
firms to generate more revenue.  This helps us understand how the large server based 
games that use the pay for currency model are able to enter the market in the App Store.  
One question that remains however, is what about the pay for currency model allows for 
greater generation of profits than other business models?  One possible answer to this 
question lies in price discrimination.  This chapter argues that apps that follow the 
“freemium” model make use of 3rd degree price discrimination, while the pay for 
currency model achieves a form of first-degree price discrimination 
 
4.1 Defining Price Discrimination 
The two types of price discrimination here are be first-degree price discrimination 
and third-degree price discrimination.  According to Varian(2010) “First-degree price 
discrimination means that the monopolist sells different units of output for different 
prices and these prices may differ from person to person”(Varian 2010, 462) This means 
that in order to be perfect price discrimination, every unit of output is sold for as much as 
anyone is willing to spend on it.  In this scenario, everyone who buys the good does so at 
their own reservation price.  Most economics textbooks agree that there are few if any 
real life examples of perfect price discrimination at work.  Varian(2010) uses the example 
of a website that offers deals on airfare.  This achieves a form of price discrimination, but 
the airline does not capture consumer surplus from those consumers that have a 
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reservation price above the retail value of the ticket.  The airline that uses this practice 
does not achieve perfect price discrimination in the way that the pay for currency model 
does.  The rise of the in-app purchase, and subsequently the pay for currency model, 
actually seems to come much closer to perfect price discrimination than any previous 
existing market. 
Third-degree price discrimination usually occurs when a firm charges different 
prices for a good to different groups of people.  In third-degree price discrimination often 
what happens is that a firm will set different prices in different markets for a good.  This 
allows the firm to charge higher prices in the market that has a higher willingness to pay 
for the good.  The application of third-degree price discrimination in the App Store 
mostly takes the form of the “freemium” games that we mentioned earlier.  We explore 
exactly how this concept of third-degree price discrimination applies to the “freemium” 
model later in this chapter. 
 
4.2 Freemium Model as Third Degree Price-Discrimination 
Recall that in the freemium model, several versions of the game are distributed.  
Often, one of these versions is free, although this does not matter for purposes of third-
degree price discrimination.  The firm distributes different versions of the game software 
at different prices.  This could mean that the free or lower priced versions contain 
advertisements, it could mean that only some of the content of the game is available for 
these cheaper versions, or that progress can only be made up to a certain point in the 
game unless the premium version is purchased.  The highest priced version distributed is 
the full game, with no advertisements or restrictions.  
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When we think back on what it means to be third-degree price discrimination it is 
not immediately obvious how this applies to the freemium model.  Third-degree price 
discrimination involves selling units of output at different prices to different groups, but 
who are the different groups in this case?  In the freemium model, we can consider at 
least two distinct groups of gamers.  One group is the core gamers.  These are people who 
enjoy playing this video game enough to spend money on it.  The premium version of the 
game software is targeted at this group of people.  The other group of people targeted is 
the casual gamers who do not enjoy playing video games as much. 
A similar example of this kind of third-degree price discrimination is the sale of 
airline tickets.  In this case airline firms offer two (or more) options to consumers.  The 
first option to consumers is to buy a coach ticket.  The second option is to buy a first-
class ticket.  In this way the airline charges different prices to different groups who have 
different willingness to pay for airline tickets.  In the same way, freemium games offer a 
free or less expensive version that resembles a coach ticket, and then also a premium 
version which is the “first-class” version of the game. 
There are several assumptions of third degree price discrimination that we must 
examine before we accept the claim that freemium firms are third-degree price 
discriminators.  The first assumption is that the firm can identify at least two distinct 
groups of people and can sell the software to each group at different prices. The second is 
that the goods are non-transferable, so that people in the higher paying group cannot 
simply buy the good from those in the lower paying group.  The third assumption is that 
the same good is produced for both groups of consumers. 
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Looking at the first assumption, we must ask how freemium app distribution firms 
identify distinct groups of consumers.  In this case, the groups of consumers are split up 
into groups by their reservation price.  Someone who values the game more is generally 
willing to pay more for the game to buy the premium version.  This allows this consumer 
to get more use out of the game.  Similarly, someone who does not value the game very 
highly is more likely to be content with the limited version of the game.  This person does 
not spend the extra money on the premium version and is content to use the free or less 
expensive version.  Returning back to our question of how firms identify these groups of 
consumers, we can see that it is the consumers who identify themselves.  Consumers who 
place a high enough value on the game buy the full version, while others may only 
download the less expensive version. 
Our second assumption of third-degree price discrimination is that the goods are 
non-transferable.  There are several barriers in place that prevent these goods from being 
transferable.  The key idea here is that in order to purchase these products, a consumer 
must use an Apple ID, which is unique to them.  This means that a game can only be 
downloaded to devices, which share an Apple ID.  Apple places restrictions on the 
number of devices that can use the same Apple ID. Technically a user could share a game 
that they bought with one or two other people, but this would mean that both users 
devices are linked to the same Apple ID.  This is quite inconvenient for the consumer 
because then they cannot make their own App Store purchases. 
Another question about goods being non-transferable lies in the concept of 
software piracy.  After all many types of software goods are redistributed online for free 
illegally over peer-to-peer file sharing networks.  Does this mean then that someone can 
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download the full version of a freemium game and then redistribute it for free?  It turns 
out that Apple again solves this problem by closely controlling what software can be run 
on their devices.  On the Android platform, the largest competitor to Apples iOS 
operating system, users can download software anywhere written by anyone and run it on 
their device.  Apple devices are different however.  Apple devices can generally only run 
software downloaded from the App Store.  This means that Apple has direct control over 
all software that is runnable on their devices.  Even if the source code for an app became 
readily available, people would still not be able to transfer the product to each other.  This 
is because in order to run source code on an Apple Device, a user needs to purchase an 
Apple developer license.  This license costs $100 per year, far more than almost every 
game in the app store.  A person is better off simply buying the game rather than trying to 
pirate by purchasing a developer license.  In this way Apple prevents piracy of App Store 
software and ensures that all software goods for iOS devices are non transferable. 
The third assumption is the most difficult to justify for the freemium model.  We 
claim that it is the same good that is being sold to all groups of consumers, but at first it 
seems that the people paying for the premium version are actually buying a different 
good.  After all when a consumer buys the more expensive version, they are buying more 
levels, features, or playing time.  It is true, that from a consumer’s perspective, it seems 
as though the premium version is a better good that is a different unit of output. 
Looking from the firm’s perspective however, we can see a different story.  To 
the firm, there is no distinction between producing each version of the game.  It costs just 
as much for the firm to distribute a free version of the app as it does to distribute the 
premium version.  The vast majority of the production process for these games is 
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independent of the different versions of the game.  The firm spends lots of money 
designing and implementing things like the graphics, game engine, and user interface, but 
then it is extremely easy for the firm to release different versions with or without certain 
features or levels at different prices.  In a sense, consumers are paying different amounts 
for the firm’s efforts to create the game framework, because it is released in different 
versions. 
 
4.3 Pay for Currency Model as First-Degree Discrimination 
Extremely few examples of first-degree price discrimination exist in the real 
world.  This is because there is generally no practical way to actually find out what 
people’s reservation price is for a good.  Here, we argue that games that follow the pay 
for currency model achieve a practical, true form of first-degree discrimination. 
Before we can make assumptions about price discrimination we need to clear up 
exactly why the pay for currency model is first-degree discrimination.  The most 
important question about price discrimination here is what the good that people are 
purchasing is.  Most simple economic models assume that consumers are deciding 
between purchasing a good or not to purchasing a good.  In the pay for currency model 
however, there is no concrete good that costs a specific amount to produce and a specific 
amount to buy.  Users of pay for currency games are free to download and use the game 
without paying anything.  Conversely, a user may also download the game, and spend 
hundreds or even thousands of dollars on the in-app currency to advance more quickly. 
As we discussed earlier, consumers have a certain reservation price for a good, 
which represents their willingness to spend a given amount of money on that good.  If the 
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consumer is willing to spend more on the good than the good’s price, then the consumer 
purchases the good.  If not, then the consumer does not purchase the good and the firm 
does not receive any revenues from that would be customer. 
For purposes of this example, we assume that a consumer faces two options.  The 
first choice is to simply refrain from downloading the app at all.  The second choice is to 
download the app and purchase an amount of in-app currency equal to the consumer’s 
willingness to pay.  Now at first glance, this should raise some economic suspicion.   
It seems here however that the prices do not differ from person to person.  Each 
user gets exactly what he or she pays for in currency.  People who spend more are 
actually buying more output than people who spend less because they get more in-game 
currency.  When we look at the supply side however we can see a different story.  To the 
producer, selling 50 units of currency is no different than selling 50,000 units of 
currency.  In both of these cases, the firm is not actually producing anything; it is simply 
changing numbers in a computer.  For the firm, the marginal cost of producing currency 
is zero.  For this reason, it makes more sense to think of the producer as simply producing 
the game itself, and each consumer as spending his or her entire willingness to spend on 
in game currency. 
Here it is helpful to look back on the argument for our third assumption of third-
degree price discrimination because the argument is very similar.  The goods that the 
consumer is directly purchasing are not the same as the units of output for the firm.  This 
is quite an odd concept, and one that only makes sense in this sort of software market.  
Like in the freemium model, the good that the firm is producing is the game.  In the 
freemium model, the producer creates a game framework that is then easy to release in 
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differently priced versions.  In the pay for currency model, the producer creates the game, 
and allows different users to spend however much they desire on in-app purchases. 
It is important to remember here that we are focusing on the supply side of this 
market.  From the consumer’s view, more spending can result in higher utility.  From the 
firm’s point of view however the only thing being produced is the game itself.  From 
each consumer who downloads the game, the firm receives the consumer’s entire 
willingness to pay, at no additional cost other than maintaining the server.  It is important 
to note all members of the firm’s network cost the same to the firm.  It costs nothing for 
the firm to produce currency, because it is simply part of the game.  In other words, the 
firm faces the same costs for all users, but is able to charge each user their maximum 
willingness to pay.  In this way, the pay for currency model in the App Store has been 
able to achieve a form of price discrimination that is closer to first-degree than any other 
business strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary of the Findings 
Looking at the pay for currency model, it is difficult to relate the current models 
of cost and production functions to this type of market for several reasons.  The first 
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reason is a question of how to define output.  For most goods, the number of the good 
that the firm produces is a clear measure of production.  Looking at a pay for currency 
model app however we can see that this gets more complicated.  Is production based on 
how many people download the app?  Or is it based on the number of in app purchases?  
Essentially what models like pay for currency and freemium do is separate the good 
being supplied from the good being demanded and paid for.  This allows the firms to 
change the unit that the consumer is buying and price discriminate. 
Using theoretical methods, we have developed a model for network externalities 
that allows for non-paying customers.  This applies very well to the pay for currency 
model because this model supports free riders.  One of the drawbacks of this model is 
that it assumes that the good is being distributed at a set price.  In chapter four however, 
we learned that this is not the case in the pay for currency model, which achieves first-
degree price discrimination.  When we think of network externalities in terms of first-
degree price discrimination, it becomes even more powerful. 
 
5.2 Business Implications 
In our current model with free riders, each consumer is limited to paying only the 
price of the good.  It does not matter that some consumers are willing to pay exorbitant 
amounts of money for the good, because they only have to spend the price.  In the future, 
this model could be made more powerful if it could take into account the first-degree 
price discrimination, and make predictions about consumer and producer surplus. 
Because of the presence of network externalities, each person’s willingness to pay 
is dependent on the number of people in the network.  In a normal goods market with 
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network externalities, the firm is only able to collect the price of the good from each 
person that decides to consume.   
As mobile device and computer technology become more powerful, software 
development firms are getting more advanced tools to create pricing and distribution 
schemes.  In-app purchases are a good example of this phenomenon.  New computer 
technology has allowed firms more direct control over each individual user’s experience, 
which in turn allows them to price more effectively.  In-app purchases for iPhone games 
are just the beginning however.  The future might bring us new virtual worlds that allow 
people to interact in business and social settings as well as in gaming settings.  The rules 
and pricing of these types of environments have yet to be determined, but the pay for 
currency model certainly seems like the beginning.  The firms that can make use of these 
tools, and come up with dynamic and effective business strategies will be the ones to 
succeed in as these markets become larger and more competitive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  39 
Bibliography 
Chow, Gregory C. 1967. "Technological Change and the Demand for Computers." The 
American Economic Review 57.5  pp. 1117-130.  
 
Kou, Chia-Wei, Hyun-Soo Ahn, and Goker Aydin. 2011. "Dynamic Pricing of Limited 
Inventories When Customers Negotiate." Operations Research 59.4 pp. 882-97.  
 
Pindyck, Robert S., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2005. "Price Discrimination." 
Microeconomics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, pp. 393-403. 
 
Pindyck, Robert S., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2005. "Network Externalities." 
Microeconomics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, pp. 136-40. 
 
Suarez, Fernando F., Micheal A. Cusumano, and Steven J. Kahl. 2013."Services and the 
Business Models of Product Firms: An Empirical Analysis of the Software 
Industry." Management Science 59.2 pp.420-35 
 
Suarez, Fernando F., Micheal A. Cusumano, and Steven J. Kahl. 2013.  "Services and the 
Business Models of Product Firms: An Empirical Analysis of the Software 
Industry." Management Science 59.2 pp.420-35.  
 
Varian, Hal R. 2010. "Network Externalities." Intermediate Microeconomics A Modern 
Approach. New Delhi: East-West, pp.678-86. 
 
Varian, Hal R. 2010. "Monopoly Behavior." Intermediate Microeconomics A Modern 
Approach. New Delhi: East-West, pp. 461-73. Print. 
 
 
